In addition, any acceptance of a concept that small atomics can be used without spreading to general war not only implies, but demands, rationality and a willingness to confine the conflict on the part of both participants. Under such circumstances our massive retaliation force is imperative and we find ourselves tied to it, if we wish to project our national policies. At this point, there is no guarantee that the use, by us, of “X” size weapon will not mushroom by reason of progressive build-up of each retaliation, into general war. We can expect, with reasonable certainty, to be armed with a family of small “clean” nuclear weapons in the near future plus an IRBM and I CBM capability.Ĭonsidering the limited size of our present conventional forces, we can readily visualize military situations, short of general war, where we would be faced with an unacceptable defeat unless we resort to the use of the small atomics. At the present time we have some conventional forces, aircraft nuclear delivery systems vested in the Air Force and Naval Aviation, and short range tactical missile teams. To answer this question we must examine our present capabilities and our direction of development. Is our capability to contain Communist military action entirely vested in our massive retaliatory concept and, if so, is this concept fitted to our national objectives? In other words, is this all we have, and can it do what we want it to do? In assessing our present position and future course of action, we must ask ourselves one basic question: We dare not inadvertently place ourselves in such a position that we find ourselves so tied to massive retaliation that there is no other course of action open to us to meet Soviet expansion. But, if the danger of Soviet nuclear war is not our greatest danger, then we must reassess our future programs so that we can meet the real threat. For, if the greatest danger lies in Soviet nuclear war alone, then we are on the right track. We must ask ourselves if the proposed expenditure of large sums of monies and critical increments of time are being directed toward our greatest danger. We dare not chase the spectre of Soviet nuclear war in such a way that we abandon those less dramatic, yet vital, requirements of a balanced program for security. For we may soon find ourselves the proud possessor of a capability to retaliate which depends upon initial action elsewhere, but which is incapable of projecting national policy on any scale less than nuclear war. Whereas it is agreed that we need a finite retaliation force, the authors feel that the nation is in danger of becoming so bewitched with the basic power of nuclear weapons that we have forgotten their very serious limitations, limitations which may well prove more dangerous than nuclear war itself. The rationalization behind such pronouncements and proposed actions seems to be but a single thought: “We must increase our massive retaliation forces to such an extent that the Soviets will never attack us.” If the West shrinks in the last minute, however, from resorting to the weapons, the only alternative that remains is capitulation”Ĭurrent hue and cry from many quarters insists that no matter how much has been spent in the past to develop nuclear delivery capability it is imperative that we waste no more money and effort on other “outmoded” weapons but must immediately devote every effort towards the biggest, best, and especially the most nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. “If we prepare voluntarily for a situation in which we can counter non-atomic attack only with atomic weapons, because we lack adequate classical forces and have failed to prepare for conventional war, we are already marked in the future annals of history as atomic war criminals born of degeneracy.
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